The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper we examine the incentive for licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power. We show that licensing in the downstream industry is profitable if and only if licensing increases competition in the upstream industry. We also find that a monopolist in the final goods market has the incentive for licensing if licensing changes the market structure of the upstream industry. Thus, our analysis provides a rationale for 'second sourcing'.
Introduction
The existing vast literature on technology licensing in imperfectly competitive markets mainly address the issues such as the feasibility of technology licensing, the quality of the transferred technology, optimal patent licensing contract, the concentration effects of technology licensing, effects of licensing on government policies, role of product differentiation and pre-commitment strategies on technology licensing. While some of the previous works have considered the situations where licenser and licensee(s) do not compete in the same market, others have focused on the situations where licenser and licensee(s) compete in the same market. Sufficient attention has also been paid to see the importance of informational structure on licensing. For a representative sample of works on technology licensing, one may look at Gallini and Winter (1985) , Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Rockett (1990a, b) , Gallini and Wright (1990) , Marjit (1990) , Beggs (1992) , Kamien and Tauman (1986) , Kabiraj and Marjit (1992 , 1993 , Kamien et al. (1992) , Kabiraj (1994) , Bousquet et al. (1998) , Mukherjee (2001 Mukherjee ( , 2002 , Mukherjee and balasubramanian (2001) and Schmitz (2002) . 1 However, the previous works share one common feature, viz., the ignorance of the strategic decisions in the input market. Like final goods market, input markets are often characterized by imperfect competition. For example, the energy sector or power-generating sector is characterized by oligopolistic competition. As demonstrated by Tyagi (1999) , the market for microprocessors, aircraft-engines and many others are also characterized by oligopolistic competition. Therefore, while the results of the previous works on technology licensing are relevant for the perfectly competitive input markets or vertically integrated industries, those analysis are not suitable for industries where the input suppliers have significant market power.
Hence, we feel that it is important to consider the role of the vertically separated industry on technology licensing.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. We examine the possibility of technology licensing in a vertically separated industry where the firms in the upstream industry possess market power. Particularly, we show that the structure of the upstream industry has important implications for a profitable licensing in the downstream industry. Technology licensing in the downstream industry influences and also influenced by the market structure of the upstream industry.
In what follows, in the next section we consider an economy with downstream and upstream industries. There are Cournot duopolists in the downstream industry who purchase input for their production from the upstream industry. One downstream firm is assumed to be technologically superior compared to its competitor. There is an incumbent input supplier and a potential entrant in the upstream industry. While the production technologies of the upstream firms are same, the entrant in the upstream industry needs to incur an entry cost. This simple model of incumbent and entrant in the upstream industry will help us to show the importance of the upstream market structure on the profitability of licensing in the downstream industry. In case of entry in the upstream industry, we consider that the input suppliers compete like Cournot duopolists. 2 In this framework, we examine the profitability of fixed-fee licensing contract in the downstream industry. As already noted in the literature, the possibility of imitation or 'inventing around' the licensed technology by the licensee or lack of information needed for a royalty provision might be the reason for a licensing contract with up-front fixed-fee only (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and Rockett, 1990a ). If the technological differences between the downstream firms are very large then we find that, under non-licensing, the upstream industry finds it profitable to supply the input for the technologically efficient downstream firm only. Hence, in this situation, the downstream industry is effectively monopoly without licensing. We find that here licensing is always optimal in the downstream industry if licensing creates higher competition in the upstream industry. Even if licensing increases competition in the downstream industry, in this situation, it helps to reduce input price by encouraging entry in the upstream industry. This benefit from lower input price outweighs the effect of higher competition in the downstream industry. Hence, the monopolist final goods producer has the incentive to license its technology to another firm if licensing enhances competition in the upstream industry. This result is in sharp contrast to the previous literature where a firm behaving as monopolist or near monopolist in the product market does not provide license to the technologically inefficient competitor (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 , Marjit, 1990 ).
The literature on 'second-sourcing' has argued that it is better to create a second source of production when lack of commitment creates opportunism (see, e.g., Shepard, 1987 and Farrell and Gallini, 1988) . The possibility of the second source of production helps to reduce the opportunistic behavior of the firms and creates a more efficient outcome. Our result shows that, monopoly final goods producer may find it optimal to create a second source of input demand if that strategy helps to reduce the price of input by creating higher competition in the upstream industry. Thus, we show that 'second-sourcing' can be optimal even if there is no problem of commitment.
The present paper suggests that when the upstream firms have significant market power then it creates upward and downward bias on licensing compared to the situation where the upstream industry is competitive, as considered in the previous works on licensing. We find that whether market power of the upstream firms creates upward or downward bias on licensing depends on the effect of licensing on the upstream market structure and also on the initial technological difference between the downstream firms. Thus, unlike the previous contribution on licensing (see, e.g., Schmitz, 2002 ), the present paper shows the possibility of both upward and downward bias on licensing and also in absence of any informational problem. Rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the model and the results. Section 3 concludes the paper.
The model and results
Let us assume an economy with upstream and downstream industries. Consider the following structure of the upstream industry. Assume that there is an incumbent firm and a potential entrant in the upstream industry. The firms in the upstream industry produce input for the firms in the downstream industry. We assume that each of the input suppliers in the upstream industry has same production technology and faces constant marginal cost of production, which is, for simplicity, assumed to be zero.
However, we assume that the entrant in the upstream industry needs to incur an entry cost if it decides to enter the upstream industry. If there is no entry in the upstream industry, the incumbent input supplier becomes the monopoly in the upstream industry and takes its production decision. Input price will be determined from the input demand. In case of entry, these input suppliers act as homogeneous Cournot duopolists in the upstream industry. The input suppliers simultaneously decide the volume of production. Price of input, corresponding to the total supply of input, will be determined from the input demand schedule. We assume that there is no further cost associated with input production. We define the input suppliers by and . Assume that the inverse market demand for the products of and is given by
where, and are the outputs of and respectively and
P is the price of the final product.
Let us first consider the output decisions of the downstream firms. Given the input price, denoted by , and will produce respectively
It is important to note that the output of will be zero provided
Therefore, total demand for input for a given price of input is given by q a w
It is clear that there will be no input demand for w . Given this structure of the input demand, it is easy to understand that whether the upstream firm(s) produce their outputs in a way to serve both downstream firms (i.e., the corresponding input price will be less than
) or only the technologically efficient downstream firm (i.e., the corresponding input price will be more than
) is also a decision faced by the upstream firm(s). As we will show in the following analysis, if the value of λ is less than 2 , then it is better for the upstream firm(s) to serve both downstream firms. In subsections 2.1 -2.4, we will do our analysis for the situations where the upstream industry will produce for both downstream firms. Further, we will consider symmetric equilibrium in the upstream industry. In section 2.5 we will consider the other situation where the upstream industry will supply for the technologically efficient firm only, under non-licensing. 4 given by the expression (3). Therefore, the th firm,
Non-licensing
, in the upstream industry will maximize the following expression
where, j i ≠ and we use the superscripts to imply the output of the upstream firms.
Thus, we find that in a symmetric equilibrium each upstream firm produces a ( ) 1 9 +λ and total input supply is . Therefore, optimal profit of and is We have done our analysis under the assumption that the upstream firms will produce for both downstream firms. If instead they produced only for the efficient downstream firm then the input demand function would be given by the expression (4). In this situation, it is easy to check that total input supply will be
, in a symmetric equilibrium. This is because the total input production that maximizes the profits of the upstream firms, i.e., 3 a , generates input price equals to 3 a , which is lower than and also it will not be less than
is less than 3 a . In the symmetric equilibrium, we assume that the upstream firms share this total input supply equally. Hence, in that case, the optimal profit of and will be 
) and π λ λ λ λ 
) .
Note that when the upstream industry is duopoly then, given the optimal price of the input, both downstream firms will produce positive output provided 7 .
This condition holds for
We summarize the above discussion in the following lemma. 
No-entry in the upstream industry
In this subsection we will consider the situation for . This implies that the entrant in the upstream industry will not enter in stage 2 and the upstream industry will be monopoly of the incumbent input supplier, i.e., of . Again, we will do our analysis for the situation where the monopoly input supplier will provide input for both downstream firms and hence, facing the demand for input given by the expression (3).
Therefore, here I will maximize the following expression
In this situation, the optimal input production is , and also it will not be less than . Hence, the optimal profit of the upstream monopolist will be . Comparing the profit levels we find that 
Note that when the upstream industry is monopoly then, given the optimal price of the input, both downstream firms will produce positive output provided 5 .
The following lemma summarizes the discussion of this subsection. 
Licensing
Now we do our analysis conditional on licensing in stage 1. If licensing occurs in 
It is important to note that when licensing occurs in stage 1, both downstream firms will always produce positive outputs as long as a w < . Therefore, in case of licensing, the upstream firms will always produce for both downstream firms irrespective of the market structure of the upstream industry.
Next, we consider the situation under licensing for (10)
Input prices under licensing and non-licensing
In the previous sections we have considered input prices conditional on licensing and non-licensing in stage 1. We have found that the upstream industry will be duopoly 
The left hand side (LHS) of (11) is negative for λ = 1 and positive for λ = 2 . Further LHS of (11) 
Condition for profitable licensing contract
In subsections 2.1 and 2.2 we have considered the profits of the downstream firms under the assumption of non-licensing and licensing. In this subsection we will examine the profitability of licensing in stage 1. Since we are considering licensing contract with up-front fixed-fee only, it is enough to consider the industry profits with and without licensing for examining the condition for profitable licensing contract.
Let us first consider the situation where (6) and (9) respectively. Comparing (6) and (9) we find that the expression (9) is greater than (6) provided 0 9 4 7 7 9 7 4 7 8 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 5 . Therefore, licensing is not optimal when the upstream industry is duopoly irrespective of the licensing decision in the downstream industry.
Figure 2
Next, we consider the opposite situation of the above case, i.e., where the upstream industry is monopoly irrespective of the licensing decision in the downstream industry. This happens for (8) and (10) respectively. Comparing (8) and (10) we find that the expression (10) is greater than 
RHS of (13) is positive for λ ∈( , ) 1 2 (see Figure 3) . Therefore, licensing is not optimal when the upstream industry is monopoly irrespective of the licensing decision in the downstream industry.
Figure 3
Finally, we consider the situation for F a a (8) and (9) respectively. Comparing (8) and (9) we find that the expression (9) will be greater than (8) provided We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. (ii) If F a a The above result is in sharp contrast to the previous papers on licensing.
Ignoring the market power of the upstream firms, the previous papers have argued that licensing between the firms producing the final product is profitable provided the initial technologies of these firms are sufficiently close (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and Marjit, 1990) . Proposition 2(i) shows that even if the technologies are sufficiently close, licensing is never optimal when the upstream market structure is not affected due to licensing in the downstream industry. On the other hand, Proposition 2(ii) shows that licensing is profitable only if licensing changes the upstream market structure. Therefore, whether licensing in the downstream industry is profitable in presence of market power of the upstream firms depends on the effect of licensing on the upstream market structure.
2.5
When λ > 2
The previous subsections have considered the situation where, under non-licensing, the firms in the upstream industry produce for both downstream firms irrespective of the decision on licensing in the downstream industry. This was consistent for λ < 2 .
In this subsection we will do our analysis for λ > 2 . Here, in a symmetric equilibrium in the upstream industry, the upstream firm(s), under non-licensing, will produce for the technologically efficient downstream firm only. Hence, in this situation, the demand for input, under non-licensing, is given by the expression (4). Let us now consider the situation where the upstream industry will be The previous works on 'second-sourcing' (see, e.g., Shepard, 1987 and Farrell and Gallini, 1988) argue that alternative source of production units helps to resolve the commitment problem and hence, creates the incentive for licensing by a monopolist producer. The above proposition shows that a monopolist producer has the incentive for licensing if licensing reduces input price by creating higher competition in the upstream industry. Thus, our analysis suggests that 'secondsourcing' is profitable even if there is no commitment problem but if it helps to reduce input price by changing the market structure of the upstream industry.
The above result shows that if licensing in the downstream industry changes the market structure of the upstream industry then licensing is profitable even if the technologically efficient downstream firm is a monopoly in absence of licensing. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature on licensing (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 , Marjit, 1990 where it has been shown that if the technologically efficient firm is monopoly or near monopoly in the product market then licensing is not optimal. The reason for this striking difference between this paper and the previous papers is that here licensing changes the market structure of the input market, which, in turn, reduces input price and hence, affects the marginal cost of production of the final goods producers. In a recent paper Schmitz (2002) has provided the evidence for upward bias on licensing in presence of information problem. Unlike Schmitz (2002) , the above two propositions show the possibility of both upward and downward bias on licensing and also without any information problem.
The discussions of this subsection and the previous subsection show that when the technological difference in the downstream industry is sufficiently large (i.e., λ > 2 ) then it reduces the range of entry costs in the upstream industry over which licensing is optimal in the downstream industry compared to the situation where the technological difference in the downstream industry is not so large (i.e., λ < 2 ). But, the range of technological difference over which licensing is optimal increases under λ > 2 compared to λ < 2 . Therefore, whether the incentive for licensing increases with sufficiently large technological difference in the downstream industry (i.e., λ > 2 ) compared to sufficiently small technological difference in the downstream industry (i.e., λ < 2 ) depends on the ease of entry in the upstream industry. The reason for this finding is the following.
Given entry in the upstream industry, the industry profit of the downstream industry under licensing is same under λ < 2 and λ > 2 . But, the industry profits in the downstream industry under non-licensing will be different for λ < 2 and λ > 2 .
When λ < 2 , the upstream monopolist will produce for the both downstream firms but for λ > 2 , the upstream monopolist will produce for the technologically efficient downstream firm only. The input price in the former situation, i.e., , is lower than the input price in the later situation, i.e., 2 a . Hence, the benefit of lower input price due to licensing is lower in the former situation compared to the later situation.
Hence, we have the difference in results mentioned in the Proposition 2(ii) and 3.
Conclusion
Researchers have already addressed several issues on technology licensing. While (14) .
